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This is a revised version of a paper presented at National Bureau of Economic Research 
Conference on Demography and the Economy, Yountville Napa Valley, CA, 
April 11-12, 2008. This research was supported by a grant from the U.S. Social Security 
Administration (SSA) administered by NBER. The findings and conclusions expressed 
are solely those of the authors and do not represent the views of SSA. We are grateful to 
Hans-Peter Kohler for detailed comments and suggestions and to Frank Furstenberg, 
Gopi Shah Goda, Rob Mare, Philip Morgan, Kristin Harknett, and participants at the 
NBER conference for their comments on the paper.   The level of fertility in a population is the principal determinant of the shape of its 
age structure, which in turn is a critical factor in the terms of trade within a pay-as-you-
go system of public pensions. Simulations done by the Social Security Administration 
show that the 75-year actuarial balance of the social security system would be higher by 
$2.6 trillion in present value if fertility were high (2.3 children/woman) rather than low 
(1.7). (compiled from Trustees, 2007). Partly because of their age structural 
consequences, national fertility levels are considered “too low” by a majority of 
governments in developed countries (Kohler et al. 2006).  
  This paper reviews the major factors that appear to be affecting fertility levels in 
the United States, with an eye towards making defensible statements about future 
directions of fertility. The subject covers a vast disciplinary range including demography, 
economics, sociology, public health, reproductive biology, evolutionary biology, political 
science, and psychology. There is no single, widely-accepted framework for analyzing 
the determinants of fertility at the level of a population. In its place, we will pursue an 
eclectic, inductive approach, surveying the landscape of fertility variation in search of 
clues about its principal drivers. Our search considers variation over time and space and 
across individuals.  
 
Why Do People Have Children in the Twenty-First Century? 
  It is useful to begin with this provocative question posed by Morgan and King 
(2001). If there were no compelling answer to the question, we would have to confront 
the possibility that levels of fertility will approach zero. Clearly, the answer to the 
question does not lie in the domain of finance, since children are very costly and probably   2
always have been. Early suggestions that children were a net economic asset in hunter-
gatherer or subsistence economies appear to have been inaccurate, although children’s 
greater contribution to the family economy in such circumstance reduced their net costs 
relative to children in the present (Kaplan, 1994).   
  Sociologists have usefully distinguished between childbearing aimed at satisfying 
social expectations and childbearing aimed at self-fulfillment. Thornton and Young-
DeMarco’s (2001) review of trends in attitudes about one’s own childbearing and that of 
others shows a huge reduction during the 1960s and 1970s in the degree of “oughtness” 
regarding fertility. While the desire to satisfy social expectations has not disappeared, 
people began to perceive less social pressure to bear children and to have less rigid 
expectations of others’ performance. Increasingly, people justified childbearing in terms 
of its impact on their personal well-being, satisfaction, and happiness. One of the 
instrumental features of children that several sociologists have stressed is their value in 
forming social networks (Schoen et al. 1997).  
  In view of the imperatives of reproduction for the survival of a species, it would 
be surprising if the rewards from childbearing and childrearing did not have a deep 
evolutionary basis imprinted in human biology (Foster 2000). Recent investigations in 
psychology help to clarify the nature of these rewards. Bartels and Zeki (2004) use fMRI 
imaging to measure brain activity in mothers when they viewed pictures of their own 
children and those of acquainted children and adults.
1 Pictures of their own children, but 
not of others, activated regions of the brain rich in oxytocin and vasopressin receptors-- 
neurohormones associated with pair-bonding-- while deactivating regions associated with 
                                                 
1 To date, there have been no equivalent studies of fathers.   3
negative emotions and social judgment. Animal studies confirm the central role of 
oxytocin and vasopressin in attachment and bonding (Carter et al., 2005).  
 Mothers  are  aware  of the intense emotions evoked by their children. “The 
Motherhood Study”, a nationally representative telephone survey of 2,009 mothers, found 
that 93% agreed with the statement that “I have an overwhelming love for my children 
unlike anything I feel for anyone else.” 81% said that they were very satisfied with their 
life as a mother and an equal percentage agreed that “being a mother is the most 
important thing that I do.” (Erickson and Aird 2005). The potential rewards of 
parenthood-- presumably social as well as emotional-- are acknowledged by high school 
seniors, three quarters of whom believe that motherhood and fatherhood will be fulfilling. 
Between 1976-77 and 1997-98, the percentage so reporting rose by 11 points for women 
and 7 points for men (Thornton and Young-DeMarco 2001). The increase was greatest 
for females and males whose fathers had attended college (Sayer, Wright, and Edin, 
2003). 
  It is possible that the rewards and costs of childbearing are not fully appreciated 
until one has a child. One ethnographic study reports that mothers in fact did not 
anticipate how completely they would fall in love with their offspring (McMahon 1995), 
which raises the possibility that the motivations for having the first child are 
systematically different from those of subsequent children. A study in Bulgaria (Buhler 
2006) concluded that the principal attitudes predictive of having a first child were beliefs 
that it would strengthen relations with partner and parents, whereas the principal attitude 
predictive of a second child for both men and women was the perception that it would 
bring “increased joy and satisfaction in life.” Companionship for the first child is also   4
often cited as a motivation for having a second child (Fawcett 1983). In a careful study of 
reported happiness among monozygotic twins in Denmark, having one child was found to 
increase the happiness of young women, but there was no increment in happiness from 
additional children (Kohler et al. 2005). Once partnership status was controlled, men’s 
happiness was unaffected by the number of children he had, including the first.  
 
Recent Trends in American Fertility 
  The most common measure of fertility is the period total fertility rate (TFR), 
which indicates how many children would be born to a woman who survived to the end 
of her reproductive years and experienced at each age the observed age-specific fertility 
rate of a particular period. The level of the total fertility rate that allows each generation 
to replace itself exactly is approximately 2.08 children per woman. Figure 1 shows the 
value of the TFR in the United States since 1928. With virtually no interruption except 
the post-World War II baby boom, the TFR fell continuously from 1820 to 1975 (not 
shown). Since 1989 it has remained in the narrow range of 1.98 to 2.10. Figure 1 also 
shows the average number of children ever born to cohorts who completed their 
childbearing and were aged 26 during the year shown on the x axis.
2 Clearly, there has 
been less volatility in the completed family sizes of actual cohorts than in the period 
measures based on synthetic cohorts. This relation is also evident in Europe (Bongaarts 
2002). 
  The period TFR is usefully considered to consist of a volume component, 
measuring the completed family sizes of cohorts then bearing children, and a timing 
                                                 
2 The completed family size of a cohort would be identical to the TFR of the cohort if there were no 
differences in fertility at a particular age between migrants and non-migrants or between those who survive 
to age 45 and those who die before reaching that age.   5
component, indicating when in the course of their lives the cohorts will bear their 
children. During a period when ages at childbearing are growing older, the period TFR 
will be systematically lower than the TFR of relevant cohorts because of a “thinning out” 
of lifetime cohort births.
3 Based upon age-specific rates of childbearing provided by the 
National Center for Health Statistics, the mean age at childbirth in the US has risen fairly 
steadily from 26.00 in 1980 to 27.90 in 2005. Using an adjustment formula developed by 
Ryder, we find that this delay has reduced period total fertility rates in the US during this 
period by about 0.15 children per woman. A more elaborate procedure developed by 
Bongaarts and Feeney produces a similar reduction averaging 0.14 children per woman 
over the period 1980-1997 (Schoen, 2004). Faster delays in Europe have had a slightly 
bigger impact on period fertility levels there, averaging 0.26 in 18 countries over the 
period 1990-97 (Bongaarts 2002). So the volume components of European and American 
fertility levels are somewhat more similar than would appear from period TFR measures. 
  The decline in American fertility is reflected in changes in the distribution of 
parities (the number of children a woman has born) among women who have completed 
childbearing. Figure 2 shows that parity two has become the most common destination 
for women, while parities zero and one have grown steadily in frequency; families of 
three have become somewhat less common, and families of four or more children have 
fallen precipitously from being the most common in 1976 (i.e., among mothers of the 
baby boom) to the least frequent in 2002.  
   Bearing children is subject to disturbances that can raise or lower the number of 
births relative to intentions or expectations.  Morgan (2003) finds that only 38% of 
                                                 
3 In the extreme, imagine that the cohort born in 1970 had all of its births at age 29.0 and the cohort born in 
1971 had all of its births at age 30.0. In 2000, there would be no births at all. This deficit in period rates 
would not be offset by a subsequent surplus unless ages at childbearing eventually became younger again.    6
women aged 22 in the National Longitudinal Study of Youth in 1982 had realized their 
stated intended parity by age 40. A common form of interference is poor contraception, 
either through method failure or failure to use any contraception when no conception is 
wanted. By European standards, Americans have an unusually high incidence of 
unwanted or mistimed births. 14% of births during the period 1997-2002 were 
retrospectively classified as “unwanted” (i.e. not wanted at any time in the future) at the 
time of conception by their mother and 21% were mistimed (US National Center for 
Health Statistics 2005a). While a mistimed birth will not necessarily increase a woman’s 
parity above her intentions, an unwanted birth will. 44% of births to 22-44-year-old 
women who had not completed high school were classified as unwanted or mistimed, 
compared to only 15% among women who had completed college. The high incidence of 
unwanted and mistimed births is somewhat surprising in view of the legality of abortion. 
However, abortion may not be readily available, may be expensive, or may violate 
personal moral codes. Well-educated women are less likely to have an unwanted or 
mistimed birth in part because a higher proportion of their conceptions result in an 
induced abortion. 
  One factor that can cause fertility to fall short of intentions is subfecundity. 7.4% 
of married women aged 15-44 in 2002 were classified as infertile: not practicing 
contraception and not becoming pregnant for at least one year (US National Center for 
Health Statistics 2005a)  Separation from a partner may also cause women to fall short of 
childbearing expectations (Quesnal-Vallee and Morgan, 2003). The balance of positive 
and negative forces resulted in slightly fewer births than expected by respondents in the 
National Longitudinal Survey of Youth; not surprisingly, women who began childbearing   7
late were particularly likely to fall short of targets expressed at an earlier age. Falling 
somewhat short is the typical but not universal cohort pattern (US Census Bureau 2000a; 
Hagewen and Morgan, 2005). 
  
Women, Men, Partnerships, and Children 
  By long-standing practices supported by powerful social norms, childbearing and 
childrearing in western countries occurred within marriage. The connection between 
marriage and childbearing has become more tenuous in the United States: 
  - 37% of births in 2005 were out-of-wedlock, compared to 5% in 1960 and 18% 
in 1980 (US National Center for Health Statistics 2006a; US Bureau of the Census 1979). 
  - fewer than half of American children aged 15 live with both natural parents 
(Kiernan, 2004). 
  - 60% of first births conceived before marriage in 1960-64 were “resolved” by 
marriage, compared to 23% in 1990-94 (Ventura and Bachrach 2000). 
  - two-thirds of adults now disagree with the statement that children are the main 
rationale for marriage (Thornton and Young-DeMarco 2001). 
  In short, marriage has become less important as a sanctioning device for 
childbearing and childrearing, as well as for sexual expression and cohabitation 
(Thornton and Young-DeMarco 2001). And marriage itself is changing as husbands and 
wives are becoming more similar in their household and market activities.  Married 
women are spending less time doing housework while their husbands are spending more 
time (Bianchi, 2000). 68.5% of married women aged 25-34 participated in the labor force 
in 2003, compared to 38.8% in 1970 (US Census Bureau 2005b). Signaling greater   8
independence of decisions within the family, a married woman’s labor force participation 
has become less responsive to her husband’s wage (Blau and Kahn, 2005). It has also 
become less responsive to the presence and ages of her children. The labor force 
participation rate of women with a child under age one rose from 31% in 1976 to 55% in 
2004 (US Census Bureau 2005a). 
  It is plausible to argue that the decline in marriage as a social institution and the 
changes that are occurring within marriage during the last four decades have the same 
basic sources: greater economic opportunities for women and vastly improved means of 
contraception (Chiappori and Oreffice 2008; Lundberg and Pollak, 2007; Preston, 1987). 
Both have given women more power in their lives and in their relationships.  The advent 
of the pill and the IUD in the early 1960’s provided methods that were highly effective in 
preventing pregnancy, in part because they were independent of any particular act of 
intercourse and thus required less cooperation from a partner. Marriage became less 
essential as a precondition for sexual expression. Furthermore, women could invest in 
their education and in their careers with less threat of disruption from an unwanted 
pregnancy whether inside a marriage or out (Goldin and Katz 2002). Such investment 
was also encouraged by the rise in divorce. 
  If the rise in women’s labor force participation had originated exclusively from a 
supply shift-- resulting, for example, from fertility declines induced by contraceptive 
improvements-- it is likely that women’s wages would have declined relative to men’s. 
Instead, the median earnings of women working full-time year-round rose from 61% of 
men’s in 1960 to 77% in 2005 (US Census Bureau 2007b).  An important factor in the 
increase in women’s participation and relative wages is probably the rise of service   9
industries in which productivity is not associated with physical strength. Changing norms 
relating to equity and inequality were probably important as well. The increase in 
women’s labor force participation would not have been as great had they not been able to 
find acceptable care for their children, and had they not believed that their children were 
not endangered by such care (Rindfuss et al. 2003).  
  As Gary Becker (1981) foresaw, the “gains from trade” in the conventional 
breadwinner/homemaker marriage eroded as women’s opportunities outside the home 
became more similar to those of men. The reduction in gains was likely abetted by 
improvements in technology for performing standard household tasks (Greenwood et al. 
2005; see also Isen and Stevenson, this volume). What was less foreseeable was that 
fertility would level off and even rise modestly as the institution of marriage was 
fundamentally changing. Had bearing children not been a powerful goal of most 
American women, they would have found ample reason to avoid them by virtue of their 
increasingly tentative relationships and the growing attractions of work outside the home. 
Instead, they took advantage of their new powers to maintain a fertility level that is the 
envy of most other developed countries.  
 
Individual-level Characteristics Associated with Fertility in the United States 
  In this section, we examine fertility variation according to major personal 
characteristics in order to seek some guidance about future fertility levels. We focus on 
two variables whose distributions are expected to change in predictable ways and that 
might therefore shed light on the future of fertility.   10
  One of these variables is women’s educational attainment, which has been shown 
to be negatively associated with fertility in many societies, including historically in the 
US (Yu 2006; Billari and Philipov 2004; Jones and Tertilt 2006). Prominent 
interpretations of this negative relationship are that better educated women have a higher 
opportunity cost of time and are better contraceptors. Table 1 presents the (virtually) 
completed family sizes of women aged 40-44 in National Surveys of Family Growth 
(NSFG) from 1973 to 2004.
4 Fertility has fallen by approximately one child per woman 
in three of the four educational classes and by 0.8 children among high school graduates. 
   More contemporary evidence can be generated by including younger women and 
their expected additional births. Table 2 is based upon women aged 30-44 in these same 
NSFGs.  It presents the coefficients relating years of completed schooling to children 
ever born; to additional births expected; and to the sum of these two, which we term 
“total births expected”. We use OLS regression, which has the convenient property that 
coefficients in the first two regressions add up to that in the third. We control a woman’s 
age using a second-degree polynomial.  For total births expected, the coefficient of a 
woman’s years of schooling declined from -0.153 to -0.126 to -0.097 over this period. 
Schooling became less closely associated with fertility despite the fact that educational 
differentials in women’s earnings became much steeper (Blau 1998; Goldin and Katz 
2007). The reduction in the coefficient is entirely attributable to the number of additional 
births expected; the effect of educational attainment on the number of births that had 
already occurred to women remained very stable at -0.150 to -0.163. In other words, 
                                                 
4 The 1973 NSFG was applied only to ever-married women. Approximately 5.7% of the cohort was never-
married at age 40-44 (US Bureau of the Census 1972:104). This percentage varies from 4.5% for high-
school graduates to 11.2% for college graduates. Conclusions would not be materially altered if these 
women and their relatively low levels of fertility could be included.    11
better educated women have consistently borne fewer children than more poorly educated 
women by their 30s and early 40s, but they increasingly expect to catch up before 
childbearing ends.   
  In 2002 for the first time, the NSFG was administered to men. Using the same 
format employed for women, Table 2 shows that the male coefficient of “total births 
expected” on  education is only -0.053 in 2002, about half of that for women. An obvious 
interpretation of the sex difference is that men do not bear as much of the time costs of 
children as women do. Thus, the trade-off between parenting and earnings, which rise 
with education, is less acute for men (Schultz 1994).  According to Table 2, the sex 
difference is manifest not in additional births expected but in achieved fertility, which is 
substantially less influenced by educational attainment for men than it is for women. 
  The regressions do not include any adjustment for marital status. We have argued 
that the increasing independence and power of women has made marital status less 
relevant to childbearing. Nevertheless, the large majority of births continue to occur 
within marriage and the ability of women and men to find suitable marriage partners is 
doubtless a factor in fertility levels. It is noteworthy in this context that the 2002 
coefficients on education are scarcely changed when current marital status is introduced: 
-0.097 for women remains -0.097 and -0.053 for men becomes -0.059.
5 It is not essential 
to introduce marital status factors in order to study the relation between educational 
attainment and fertility, a finding also reported in Australia (Yu, 2006). 
 A  second  major  characteristic associated with variation in American fertility is 
ethnicity. High levels of immigration in recent years have left their mark on the fertility 
of a population already distinguished by longstanding black/white divisions. Table 3 
                                                 
5 The categories are never married/not cohabiting, married, cohabiting, and widowed/separated/divorced.   12
presents the total fertility rates of major ethnic groups in the recent past.
6 The table shows 
that the fertility of non-Hispanic whites has been stable or has risen slightly during the 
past 16 years. The TFR of non-Hispanic whites in the United States would rank in a tie 
for second highest among developed countries, behind France (see below). So it is not 
correct to attribute the relatively high level of US fertility exclusively to high fertility 
among ethnic minorities-- and many European countries themselves have sizeable high-
fertility ethnic minorities. In fact, the fertility of blacks has fallen sharply and is now 
below the national average. Hispanic fertility has been roughly level over this period.    
  The individual-level data files from NSFG enable us to investigate several 
additional questions about the relationship between ethnicity and fertility. Table 4 
presents ethnic differentials in fertility among women aged 30-44, controlling age and 
years of school completed, over the period 1973 to 2002. It is clear that ethnic 
differentials in fertility persist when education is controlled. Over the 29-year period, the 
differential between blacks and whites contracted sharply while the differential between 
Hispanics and non-Hispanic whites expanded. In both cases, the trend in the differential 
is primarily attributable to changes in the number of births that have already occurred 
rather than to those that are expected in the future.  
                                                 
6 Numerators are derived from birth certificates and denominators from census estimates. The ethnic 
classification is not strictly comparable in the two sources and the National Center for Health Statistics 
(2006b) has attempted to bridge the divide. Furthermore, it is likely that the reporting of births is more 
complete for Hispanics than the estimates of populations. A substantial proportion of Hispanics are illegal 
immigrants and would not want to be reported to census authorities, whereas they have an incentive to have 
their births reported. Thus, the figures in Table 3 may be overestimated for Hispanics. Weak support for 
this suggestion comes from the 2004 Current Population Survey, wherein Hispanic women aged 40-44 
reported only 2.30 births, on average [US Census Bureau 2005a]. On the other hand, the number of births 
reported in the CPS are clearly deficient and especially so for out-of-wedlock births to Hispanics  
(www.census.gov/population/socdemo/fertility/ofw-childtx). A third source of data is the National Survey 
of Family Growth. Hispanic women aged 40-44 in the 2002 NSFG averaged 2.49 children, about 0.2 
children higher than in the CPS. Hispanic women aged 30-34 expected to bear 2.77 children in NSFG, 
implying rising fertility and giving some credibility to the still higher figure of NCHS.   13
  The increasing fertility differences between Hispanics and non-Hispanics are 
primarily a result of the changing composition of the Hispanic population itself.  Cubans 
and Puerto Ricans, who made up a larger share of the Hispanic population in the past, 
have relatively low fertility levels (TFRs of 1.733 and 2.057, respectively, in 2004). In 
contrast, Mexican-American women had a TFR of 3.021 (US National Center for Health 
Statistics 2006b).  Mexican-Americans contributed 61% of Hispanics births in 1989 and 
72% in 2004. The Mexican/non-Mexican differences reflect fertility differences in 
country of origin, as well as in length of time spent in the United States. It is unlikely that 
a widening of Hispanic/non-Hispanic fertility differences will continue. Mexican-
Americans are already a high percentage of the Hispanic population, and their fertility is 
declining across generations in the US (Parrado and Morgan, 2007). It is worth 
remembering that Italian and Polish immigrants to the US had TFRs of 6.94 and 6.97 in 
1905-09 when the US value was 3.56 (Morgan et al. 1994).  
 
Spatial Differences in US Fertility 
 Geographic  differences  in US fertility have been used in several ways. One is to 
examine the impact of interstate differences in laws, programs, and regulations that may 
be related to fertility. Moffit’s (1998) review of research on the relationship between 
welfare payments and fertility, most of which is based on interstate data, concludes that 
there are modest positive effects of benefit levels on fertility, although there are some 
contrary findings including a subsequent article on the “family cap” (Kearney 2004). As 
noted below, Klerman (1999) finds modest effects on fertility of interstate differences in 
access to abortion and of Medicaid payment schedules for abortion.   14
  A second effort to use areal data focuses on identifying what may be thought to be 
“cultural” differences in attitudes, values and practices related to childbearing. Areal 
differences in fertility are substantial. States in New England -- Massachusetts, New 
Hampshire, Rhode Island-- have 2004 TFRs in the lowest range of 1.7- 1.8.  States with 
high Mormon concentrations, Utah and Idaho, have TFRs in the highest range of 2.3-2.5. 
Lesthaeghe and Niedert (2006) perform a factor analysis and find that a state’s fertility 
level is closely related to its frequency of late marriage and of abortions per live birth. 
Since these are, in a sense, components of fertility, the results are not especially 
surprising.  
  More surprising is the high correlation that they find, -0.87, between the factor 
representing this demographic cluster and the percentage of a state that voted for George 
Bush in 2004. This correlation suggests to the authors that there may be important 
variation in the underlying structure of values and orientations that manifests itself in 
both family and political domains. They do not identify the main features of that 
structure. 
  A third approach to studying areal variation uses metropolitan areas rather than 
states as the units of analysis. Metropolitan areas form more cohesive labor markets than 
states and are better suited to testing ideas about the impact of labor market conditions on 
fertility. We have supplemented the 2002 NSFG individual-level data on fertility histories 
and personal characteristics with data on characteristics of the metropolitan areas in 
which individuals reside. We consider four aggregate-level economic indicators: the 
median earnings of female full-time full-year workers; the median earnings of male full-
time full-year workers; the unemployment rate in the area; and the median value of   15
owner-occupied houses. All data are taken from the US Census of 2000. We expect, 
following Becker (1981), that the level of women’s earnings in an area, an indicator of 
economic opportunities, will have a negative effect on fertility and that men’s earnings 
will have a positive effect. Jones, Schoonbroodt, and Tertilt (this volume) provide a broad 
review of the assumptions that are required in order to generate such predictions. We 
expect that the median value of houses, an indicator of the housing price structure, will be 
negatively related to fertility because children are space intensive. We also expect 
fertility to be negatively related to an area’s level of unemployment. 
  The model that we estimate includes individual-level variables whose values were 
established in childhood: mother’s educational attainment (that is, the mother of the 
woman interviewed in NSFG); the religion in which a woman was raised, if any; and 
whether or not her parents’ marriage was intact when she was aged 18. Coefficients of 
the OLS regression are presented in Appendix Table 1. Standard errors are not adjusted 
for clustering.  Areal variables were available for the 280 largest metropolitan areas.  
82% of weighted respondents resided in one of these areas (77 cities total) and were 
included in the analysis. 
  Coefficients of female and male earnings levels in a metropolitan area are in the 
expected direction, large, and statistically significant.  Table 5 summarizes the 
coefficients in relevant equations. As before, the coefficients of births achieved and 
additional births expected sum to the coefficient of total births expected. Both achieved 
fertility and the additional number of children expected are significantly affected by 
female and male earnings. The coefficient of female earnings on total births expected of    16
-2.7 implies that a 10% increase in relative women’s earnings would provoke a reduction 
of 0.27 children. This very large effect is highly reflective of the fertility expectations--
rather than achievements-- of younger women. If estimation is confined to women aged 
30-44, where expected family sizes have for the most part already been achieved, the 
female earnings coefficient for total births expected declines in absolute value to -1.421 
and the male declines to 1.638. 
  As in the case of a woman’s educational attainment, a woman’s marital and 
partnership status is not material to interpreting the coefficients in Table 5. When marital 
and cohabiting status is controlled, the values of coefficients on female and male earnings 
change by less than 10%.  
  The female and male earnings coefficients are roughly equal in value and opposite 
in sign, so that the ratio of female to male earnings in an area is a good predictor of 
fertility. Among large cities, the highest ratios of female to male earnings (range of 0.76 
to 0.81) are found in San Diego, Miami, Los Angeles, Tampa, Washington D.C., and 
New York City. The lowest ratios (0.62 to 0.70) are found in interior rust-belt cities of 
Detroit, St. Louis, Pittsburgh, Cleveland, and Chicago. Among smaller metropolitan 
areas, the range goes from 0.57 to 0.91.   
  For purposes of prediction we would like to be able to treat relative earnings 
levels as exogenous, but there is no question that selective migration is affecting results. 
Women with high tastes for work or low tastes for childbearing would be more likely to 
move to, or remain in, an area of relatively high women’s earnings. Likewise, women 
with high tastes for childbearing and low tastes for work might be more likely to move to 
or remain in an area of relatively high male earnings. It would be a mistake to use the   17
coefficients that we have estimated to make predictions about the future of fertility since 
those coefficients include the effects of selective migration.  A second upward bias in the 
coefficient may result from the effect of fertility patterns in an area on women’s earnings; 
e.g., non-market factors inducing low fertility in an area may cause women to accumulate 
more labor market experience and hence raise their earnings. No equivalent bias is 
expected on the coefficient of male earnings. 
  The relationship between women’s earnings in an area and fertility could be 
expected to be stronger for well-educated women than for poorly-educated women 
because areal variation in the opportunity cost of children, as well as in the gains from 
work-related migration, should be greater for those with higher potential earnings.  To 
test this hypothesis, we created an interactive variable equal to a woman’s completed 
years of schooling times the mean earnings for women in her metropolitan area. When 
added to the regression model for women aged 15-44 shown in Appendix Table 1, the 
coefficient of the interactive variable is positive and significant (p<.00). The largest 
(negative) coefficients are for births achieved rather than future births expected. So it 
does appear that the fertility of better educated women is more responsive to the level of 
earnings in a metropolitan area, although the role of selective migration adds complexity 
to the interpretation.    
  The coefficient of an area’s unemployment level is not significant. The median 
price of owner-occupied houses in an area has a significant positive coefficient, an 
unanticipated result that may reflect a wealth effect. 
        
   18
International Differences 
  An international perspective permits the examination of the effects of a broader 
range of institutional and cultural settings than is available within any single country. 
Table 6 shows that US fertility is higher than that in any other developed country with 5 
million or more inhabitants. Even the lowest-fertility US state, Rhode Island with a TFR 
of 1.71 in 2004, would rank well above the median of 1.35. As noted above, the period 
TFR underestimates cohort fertility when ages of childbearing are rising. Few cohorts 
who have recently completed childbearing in Europe have TFRs less than 1.7 (Frejka and 
Sardon 2004). In terms of parity distributions, the major difference between Europe and 
the US is not in the prevalence of childless women but rather of women with 3+ children 
(Caldwell and Schindlmyer 2003). The mean “ideal family size” in Europe remains at 
two or above except in Germany and Austria. In low-fertility Italy, it is 2.1 (Goldstein et 
al. 2003). 
  One prominent explanation of declining fertility in Europe is called “the second 
demographic transition”, according to which the emergence of individualism and its 
emphasis on self-fulfillment have undercut familistic norms (e.g., Lesthaeghe and Neidert 
2006; van de Kaa 1996). However, this explanation does a poor job of accounting for 
cross-national variation. The northern European countries where ideational changes have 
been among the most far-reaching have the highest fertility levels in Europe (McDonald 
2002), whereas many southern and eastern European countries with low fertility have 
retained relatively high levels of familism in value surveys and in many other behaviors 
such as cohabitation and divorce (Coleman 2004; Kertzer et al. 2006).    19
  Perhaps the most important observation about cross-national variation in fertility 
is that the international correlation between the TFR and women’s labor force 
participation in western Europe has become strongly positive at +0.81 (Billari and Kohler 
2004). In 1975, the correlation for these same countries was -0.61. This demonstration 
has been replicated by several other analysts using slightly different groupings of OECD 
countries (e.g., Morgan, 2003).  So countries in which the largest proportion of women 
work are now countries with the highest fertility. This relation is also apparent regionally 
in Italy (Kertzer et al. 2006)..  
  It is very likely that, because of industrial and occupational changes, the relative 
wages for women have risen in virtually all developed countries. Some countries appear 
to have been able to adapt to this change in ways that better accommodate the 
combination of women’s work with childbearing. These countries-- e.g., the United 
States, Sweden, Norway-- exhibit both high fertility and high female labor force 
participation. Some of the accommodations have been in the form of government 
programs. Hoem (2005) cites a battery of public policies in Sweden that he believes to be 
responsible for its relatively high fertility, including parental leave for 13 months at 80% 
of salary and state-run day care centers. Reviews of the effectiveness of family-friendly 
policies on fertility in Europe conclude that there have been several relatively modest 
successes (McDonald 2002, 2006; Kohler et al. 2006).   
 According  to  independent  accounts of close observers in Italy (Kertzer et al. 
2006) and Japan (Retherford and Ogawa, 2006), a major obstacle to higher fertility levels 
and greater participation of women in the labor force in these countries is the persistent 
strength of norms that idealize the traditional breadwinner/homemaker family. These   20
norms discourage mothers from working and discourage unmarried women from 
becoming mothers. Mothers are thought to be the best guardians of their children, and 
men participate relatively little in child-rearing. Policy initiatives may have little impact 
under these circumstances. Japan has made very costly efforts to raise its fertility levels. 
The programs include generous child allowances, heavily subsidized state child care 
facilities, changes in educational standards to reduce the costs of child tutoring, and laws 
designed to encourage men’s greater participation in child-rearing. But the Japanese TFR 
remains in the neighborhood of 1.3. 
  The institution of marriage appears to be more important in sanctioning 
childbearing and sexual behavior in these countries. In Japan, only 2% of births are out of 
wedlock and in Italy, 10% (Kiernan, 2004).  To state the obvious: discouraging out-of-
wedlock childbearing discourages childbearing.  If the US were to eliminate all out-of-
wedlock births and not replace them with marital births, its TFR would have been only 
1.31 in 2004. Countries with higher proportions of births out of wedlock have higher 
TFRs: the correlation is +0.65 across 37 European countries in 1999. In 1975, when 
marriage was a stronger institution, it had been -0.35 (Billari and Kohler, 2004). 
Ironically, the maintenance of traditional family values, especially in the form of rigid 
norms about appropriate sex roles within the family and the sanctity of marriage as a 
childrearing institution, may be responsible for very low levels of fertility in many places 
(see also McDonald 2000; Caldwell and Shindlmyer 2003). 
  Strong norms supportive of traditional family relations were also very prominent 
in the United States but they have substantially eroded. For example, the General Social 
Survey asked whether respondents agreed or disagreed with the statement that “It is more   21
important for a wife to help her husband’s career than to have one herself”. Only 36% of 
women disagreed with the statement in 1977-78 while 80% disagreed in 1996-98 
(Thornton and Young-DeMarco 2001). Perhaps the incentives to abandon the 
breadwinner/homemaker model were higher in the US or perhaps, as de Tocqueville 
(1945) argued 170 years ago, American society is more flexible and adaptive than 
European.  
 Whatever  adaptations occurred in the US were not primarily a product of public 
policy (Morgan 2003). The US tax code is not unusually friendly to families with 
children (d’Addio and d’Ercole 2005) and welfare benefits per child are low relative to 
child allowances in many European countries (Blau 1998). Government plays a relatively 
small role in day care for children in the US in terms of both finance and management.  
The adaptations permitting more mothers to work in the US were primarily a result of 
private negotiations between women and various childcare providers, including their 
partners. They were facilitated by institutional adaptations such as longer store hours, 
which provided both opportunities for shopping by people who worked during the day 
and jobs at an hour when a spouse may be available for child care (Kohler et al 2006). 
The labor market in the US may also be more accommodating to young workers than are 
European labor markets, which are more rigid on many quantitative indicators (Nickell, 
1997). American businesses, less encumbered by industrial policies, may have been able 
to provide more flexible hours and days. The declining coefficient relating fertility to 
women’s educational attainment is another indication that the tensions between 
childbearing and work are easing in the United States.   22
  Another major theme of de Tocqueville’s is that Americans are unusually prone to 
form and gather in private associations. One institution that they join in far greater 
numbers than Europeans is the church. 50% of American women report that religion is 
very important to them, compared to 16% of European women.  50% of American 
women aged 18-44 attend church at least once a month, compared to 26% of European 
women. (European Values Survey data cited in Frejka and Westoff, 2006). The frequency 
of church attendance is highly positively correlated with actual and expected fertility both 
in the US and in Europe (Ibid.; Philipov and Berghammer, 2007). For young parents, a 
church often provides opportunities for interaction with other young families, childcare 
services, and moral support for the difficult endeavors of parenthood (Wuthnow, 2005). 
These features may lift fertility levels among members. Taking literally the empirical 
relation between religiosity and fertility, Frejka and Westoff (2006) estimate that the 
fertility of American women aged 35-44 would be 6% lower if Americans attended 
church as infrequently as Europeans and 18% lower if they perceived the same 
importance of religion as Europeans.  
  These estimates represent upper bounds because there is undoubtedly self-
selection of family-oriented people into the community of church-goers, a tendency that 
would spuriously elevate the correlation between fertility and religious behavior. Nor 
does their analysis control other variables, such as educational attainment, that are 
correlated with both fertility and church attendance. To overcome partially these 
problems, we have used the 2002 NSFG to estimate the relationship between fertility and 
the religion of one’s upbringing, controlling a woman’s years of schooling and ethnicity. 
Results are shown in Table 7. Fertility differs substantially- by a half a child or more-   23
between those raised with no religion (about 6% of all women) and those raised with any 
religion. The additional variance explained by introducing the religious variables is 
significant at .001. 
  Thus, religious differences in fertility are not readily explained by mechanisms of 
selection or contamination by third variables. The greater religiosity of the American 
population may in fact be contributing to US/European differences in fertility. The 
fertility differences by religious affiliation hold out the possibility that fertility will rise as 
high-fertility groups have more children who inherit the religion of their parents and 
maintain their high fertility levels. This possibility is not entirely theoretical: the growth 
of fundamentalist Protestant groups in the past century is attributable primarily to their 
unusually high fertility combined with a 70-80% intergenerational retention rate (Hout, et 
al., 2001). The example illustrates a more general point: there is upward pressure on 
fertility each generation by virtue of the fact that each generation is born 
disproportionately to the high-fertility members of the previous generation.  The upward 
bias should be particularly strong when the high fertility example of one’s own parents is 
reinforced by pronatalist norms and associations such as those typically found in 
churches.  
  Why are Americans more likely to attend church and espouse religious beliefs 
than Europeans? One prominent explanation is that American religious institutions are 
more flexible and entrepreneurial than are European (Finke and Stark, 2005). Whereas 
European countries often face a virtual monopoly of religious institutions, staffed by 
clerics determined to maintain the monopoly, American religious institutions vigorously 
compete for adherents and use attendance and participation as principal gauges of   24
success. Churches represent another instance in which institutional adaptability may help 
account for high fertility in the United States relative to Europe.  
 
Implications 
  What have we learned that bears upon the future of American fertility? Several 
variables robustly associated with fertility are changing in predictable ways, as 
summarized in Table 8. One of these is ethnicity. The US Census Bureau projects the size 
and ethnic composition of the US population using data on fertility achievements and 
expectations and anticipated immigration. Its latest projections suggest that the Hispanic 
population will grow from 12.6% of the population in 2000 to 20.1% in 2030 (US Census 
Bureau, 2004a). Combined with the large Hispanic/non-Hispanic fertility differentials 
shown in Table 3, and assuming that fertility levels remain constant within ethnic 
categories, this increase in Hispanic representation would increase the TFR from 2.046 to 
2.113, an increase of .07 children. If Hispanic/non-Hispanic differentials contract, as has 
happened with other immigrant groups, the effect would be reduced.   
  A second variable related to fertility and moving in predictable directions is 
educational attainment. The US Census Bureau (2000b) projects educational attainment 
distributions to 2028.  For adult women, their projections imply a gain of approximately 
0.7 years of school completed between 2003 and 2028.
7 Combined with the fertility 
coefficient on years of schooling of -.097, such changes would produce a reduction in 
fertility of .07 children. The effect is not large, and it should be recalled that the 
coefficient of women’s education has been declining.  
                                                 
7 This is the mean gain for the high and low projections, weighted by ethnicity distributions in 2000 and 
assigning 10 years of schooling to those who did not complete high school, 12 to those who did, 14 to those 
who started but did not finish college, and 17 to those who finished college.   25
  So the two most predictable changes in population composition, educational 
attainment and ethnicity, are expected to induce relatively small changes in fertility by 
2028-30, and these changes essentially offset one another. In a multivariate framework, 
the combined changes in distributions of education and ethnicity would produce a decline 
in fertility of 0.02 children. 
8  
  We anticipate that the ratio of female to male earnings will continue to increase as 
industrial structures change and as equity norms become more universal. As noted earlier, 
our coefficients on female and male earnings represent an upper bound on the sensitivity 
of fertility to exogenous variation in these variables. To illustrate the potential impact of 
changes in the earnings ratio, we use the fertility equation for 30-44 year old women. The 
ratio of median female to male earnings of full-time full-year workers grew from 0.738 in 
1995 to 0.788 in 2005 (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 2008). If the same rate of annual 
increase occurred between 2005 and 2030, the effect on fertility would be approximately   
-1.5{0.163} = - 0..24 children, where -1.5 is the approximate coefficient of the earnings 
ratio (from Table 5) and 0.163 is the projected change in the natural log of the earnings 
ratio over a 25-year period. Thus, a continuing growth of women’s earnings relative to 
men’s may put significant downward pressure on fertility. But we reiterate that ours is an 
upper bound estimate because of possible upward biases in the coefficient resulting from 
selective migration and reverse causation. Moreover, a more egalitarian distribution of 
childraising responsibilities would be expected to reduce the sensitivity of fertility to the 
sex ratio of earnings.   
  Other factors that may play a role:    
                                                 
8 The coefficient of educational attainment in a regression controlling age and ethnicity is -.083. 
.   26
  - improvements in contraceptive technology should put mild downward pressure 
on fertility. But contraceptive improvements have been very slow since the 1960’s, 
especially in the area of male contraception. And any improvements  may be significantly 
offset by improvements in proceptive technologies for subfecund individuals. Barring 
advances in technology, improvements in contraceptive use could be expected to 
accompany improvements in educational attainment and to be captured by the estimated 
effects thereof.  
  - a more conservative Supreme Court may result in greater restrictions in access 
to abortion. Based on studies of interstate differences in access to abortion and in 
Medicaid funding thereof, the estimated effects on fertility would not be large. Klerman 
(1999) estimates that eliminating public funding altogether would increase the TFR by 
2% and that making all abortions illegal would increase it by an additional 3%. 
  - eventually, the rise in ages at childbearing must come to an end. This process 
has reduced the period TFR by approximately 0.15 children per woman. When it stops, 
period rates (but not necessarily cohort rates) will be pushed upwards. At the rate at 
which the mean age at childbearing has been rising in the US, approximately 0.08 years 
per year, it would take 20 years before the mean age in the US reached the level of 29.5 
years already observed in Sweden (and longer to reach the mean age currently observed 
in France, the Netherlands, Ireland and Spain; compiled from US Census Bureau 2004b.) 
So the timing-induced depression in US period rates could last a long time.  
  It is clear that modeling fertility timing is an important element in fertility 
projections. As Figure 1 demonstrated, the sharp changes in American fertility over the   27
past 80 years have been powerfully influenced by timing factors. The baby boom and 
baby bust could not be predicted or accounted for by the marginalist approach taken here. 
It seems likely that elements of social contagion have operated in the past to add 
volatility to period measures of fertility. There is no reason to believe that they cannot 
reappear in the future.   
  Fertility in the United States is relatively high, even for its lowest-fertility groups. 
Compared to most countries in Europe and East Asia (but not northwestern Europe), 
fertility is high even for white non-Hispanics, for states with the lowest fertility, and for 
college graduates.  One possible explanation of American “exceptionalism” is an 
unusually flexible and adaptive society, one in which women were able to react quickly 
to the rise in their work opportunities and find ways to combine motherhood and work 
while many other societies stayed wedded to more traditional family forms. If American 
women have simply been quicker to find ways to do things that women elsewhere also 
want to do-- have at least two children even when they have attractive earnings prospects 
outside of the home-- then fertility elsewhere should rise to American levels as women 
and men adapt to new circumstances and abandon older cultural forms. 
  A second, related explanation of American exceptionalism is the unusually high 
degree of religious belief and participation among Americans. Projecting religiosity into 
the future is risky, in part because recent trends are not entirely consistent. The proportion 
of American adults identifying their religious affiliation as “no religion” in the General 
Social Survey rose from 7% to 14% between 1991 and 2000 (Hout and Fischer, 2002); 
the rise was especially sharp among young adults.  On the other hand, the proportion of 
adults who identify as conservative Christians continues to grow, fueled by differential   28
fertility and high rates of intergenerational retention. And the proportion of American 
children attending church and participating in youth groups rose sharply between 1997 
and 2003 (Hofferth 2008). The possibility that American fertility has strong religious 
underpinnings does not suggest a clear-cut direction for future fertility trends, but it does 
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1925 1935 1945 1955 1965 1975 1985 1995 2005
Period TFR
Cohort TFR*
*For cohort born t-26; Note: Last data points for CTFR use imputed data; Sources: Schoen 2004, National Center for 



















1976 1980 1984 1988 1992 1995 2000 2004
Source: US Census Bureau 2005a
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1973 1988 2002
Less than high school 3.86 2.92 2.75
High school graduate/GED 2.96 2.17 2.19
Some college 3.02 2.12 2.00
Bachelor's degree or higher 2.86 1.58 1.73
Total 3.26 2.15 2.11
Table 1. Mean number of children ever born by 
women's educational attainment, women 40-44
Note: Educational attainment based on number of years of school 








1973 Women -0.153 * -0.157 * 0.004
1988 Women -0.126 * -0.163 * 0.037 *
2002 Women -0.097 * -0.150 * 0.053 *
2002 Men -0.053 * -0.101 * 0.048 *
*Significant at 0.001 level; Note: Age is controlled via a second-degree polynomial
Table 2. Coefficient of years of schooling completed among 















1989 2.014 1.770 2.424 2.904 2.916
1996 1.976 1.781 2.140 2.772 3.052
2004 2.046 1.847 2.020 2.824 3.021
Source: National Center for Health Statistics, 2006b
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Survey year, race
Non-Hispanic Blacks
1973 0.688 * 0.634 * 0.054 *
1988 0.236 * 0.204 * 0.032
2002 0.233 * 0.215 * 0.018
Hispanics
1973 0.211 0.062 0.150 *
1988 0.352 * 0.210 0.142 *
2002 0.426 * 0.336 * 0.096 *
*Significant at 0.01 level; Note: Age, age squared, and years of schooling completed are 
controlled
Table 4. Coefficients of ethnicity among women aged 30-44, 









Total births expected -2.726 ** 2.077 **
(.387) (.353)
Total births achieved -1.654 ** 1.265 **
(.321) (.265)
Total additional births expected -1.072 ** 0.811 *
(.329) (.261)
-2.492 ** 1.955 **
(.375) (.354)
-3.591 ** 2.219 **
(.516) (.419)






3Marital status categories are never married/non-cohabiting; currently married; 
currently cohabiting; and widowed/divorced/separated
Table 5. Coefficients of median female and male earnings in various fertility 
regressions
1F = Median annual earnings of full-time, full-year female workers in a metropolitan 
2F = Median annual earnings of full-time, full-year male workers in a metropolitan area
Note: Control variables listed in Appendix Table 1.
**Significant at .001
Total births expected, controlling marital status
3
Total births expected, women aged 30-44
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Country TFR (year) Country TFR (year)
United States 2.10 (2006) Hungary 1.35 (2006)
France 1.98 (2006) Spain 1.34 (2005)
Sweden 1.85 (2006) Germany 1.34 (2005)
Denmark 1.85 (2006) Greece 1.34 (2005)
Australia 1.81 (2005) Czech Republic 1.33 (2006)
Finland 1.81 (2006) Ukraine 1.32 (2006)
United Kingdom 1.79 (2005) Russia 1.31 (2006)
Belgium 1.72 (2005) Romania 1.31 (2006)
Netherlands 1.68 (2006) Poland 1.28 (2006)
Canada 1.52 (2005) Slovakia 1.25 (2005)
Switzerland 1.43 (2006) Japan 1.25 (2005)
Portugal 1.41 (2005) South Korea 1.13 (2006)
Bulgaria 1.38 (2006) Taiwan 1.12 (2005)
Austria 1.38 (2006) Hong Kong 0.99 (2006)
Italy 1.35 (2006)
Table 6. Total fertility rates in selected developed countries*








Other non-Christian religion 0.264
Table 7. Coefficients relating the expected number 
of births to religious affiliation at age 16, women 
aged 30-44, National Survey of Family Growth 2002
Note: Age, age squared, years of schooling completed, and 







Increases in proportion Hispanic +0.07 2030
Increases in women's education -0.07 2028
Increases in F/M earnings ratio (upper bound)  -0.24 2030
Possible restrictions on abortion access +0.10
Stabilization in mean age of childbearing +0.15









Age 0.131 0.318 -0.187 0.071
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.548)
Age
2 -0.002 -0.004 0.002 -0.001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.433)
Religion
Mainline Protestant (Ref)
No religion -0.414 -0.162 -0.251 -0.438
(0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000)
Catholic 0.055 0.057 -0.002 0.134
(0.324) (0.236) (0.96) (0.08)
Fundamentalist Protestant 0.101 0.143 -0.042 0.153
(0.193) (0.056) (0.48) (0.173)
Non-Christian 0.151 0.205 -0.051 0.414
(0.175) (0.025) (0.526) (0.013)
Mother's education
Less than high school 0.193 0.157 0.036 0.284
(0.003) (0.007) (0.335) (0.001)
High school (Ref)
Some college 0.079 -0.006 0.085 0.075
(0.141) (0.895) (0.047) (0.317)
Bachelor's degree or higher 0.165 0.037 0.129 0.237
(0.005) (0.432) (0.008) (0.004)
Family intact at age 18 0.112 -0.056 0.168 0.010
(0.016) (0.166) (0.000) (0.89)
Race/Ethnicity
White, Non-Hispanic (Ref)
Hispanic 0.237 0.214 0.023 0.326
(0.000) (0.000) (0.601) (0.001)
Black 0.143 0.258 -0.114 0.247
(0.009) (0.000) (0.002) (0.003)
Other race 0.276 -0.037 0.312 0.007
(0.024) (0.653) (0.007) (0.953)
-0.064 -0.153 0.088 -0.078
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
0.027 0.009 0.018 0.049
(0.092) (0.574) (0.062) (0.061)
2.077 1.265 0.811 1.638
(0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.002)
-2.726 -1.654 -1.072 -1.421
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.007)
0.204 0.008 0.196 0.004
(0.000) (0.853) (0.000) (0.957)
Note: Values in parentheses are p-values
Log of female income in 
metropolitan area
Value of owner-occupied 
housing in metropolitan area 
(per $100,000)
Women 15-44
Appendix Table 1. Coefficients of regressions of fertility on individual and areal 
variables, National Survey of Family Growth 2002
Highest grade of school 
completed
Percent unemployed in 
metropolitan area
Log of male income in 
metropolitan area
 